Geographical Monopoly: It is when there are no other sellers available in that part of the world.Įxample: A local cable servicing company has a monopoly in a particular area in a city.ģ. It also has many barriers to entry into the market.Įxample: The most familiar examples are the oil and gas, railway, and aviation industries.Ģ. Natural Monopoly: It is a situation where it is best if only one seller makes and sells a product. Vertical integration and antitrust policy.
Reddy (Eds.), Retail and marketing channels.
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Bilateral monopoly examples cracked#
Is channel coordination all it is cracked up to be? Journal of Retailing, 76, 511–548 (Winter). Manufacturer-optimal wholesale pricing when retailers compete. Channel coordination when retailers compete. Coordination and manufacturer profit maximization: The multiple retailer channel.
Mimeo: Department of Economics, University of Arkansas. Pricing in a vertical channel with fixed costs: A sticky price equilibrium with e-commerce implications. Pull promotions and channel coordination. Edgeworth 1925 (Eds.), Papers relating to political economy. Giornale degli Economisti, 15:13–31 (English translation by F. Mathematical psychics: An essay on the application of mathematics to the moral science. Managing a distribution channel under asymmetric information with performance requirements. Journal of Retailing, 72, 117–137 (Summer).ĭesiraju, R., & Moorthy, S. Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer. The economics of retailing and distribution. Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts. We also present a Channel-Modeling Proposition that we believe will help modelers avoid the errors of conceptualization described in this paper.īattacharyya, S., & Lafontaine, F. From our general, linear-demand model, we derive six Channel Propositions that correct these accumulated errors of conceptualization and that generate a richer, more broadly applicable set of managerial and modeling implications. This lack of generality is critical, because these beliefs have led to intuitively appealing (but inadvertently misleading) strategic advice for managers and modeling advice for game theorists. Our analysis reveals that the Channel Hypotheses do not generalize beyond the specific game-theoretic models from which they were derived.
For ease of comparison, we nest the bilateral-monopoly model and the identical-distributors model within our general model. To assess the validity of these Hypotheses, we develop a general, linear-demand model in which distributors face heterogeneity in demand, heterogeneity in costs, and any degree of intensity of inter-distributor competition. Game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels have generated six widely held beliefs (we call them Channel Hypotheses) whose universal soundness has not been examined.
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